Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 189-228

  Mailath, George J ^a   Morris, Stephen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036169628     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2869     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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