Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 169-188

  Schmitz, Patrick W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Contract theory; Hold up problem; Private information

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036134426     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00088-5     Document Type: Article

References (47)

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2. Renegotiation design with unverifiable information
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4. The simple economics of optimal auctions
5. Cooperative investments and the value of contracting
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7. Dissolving a partnership efficiently
8. Incentives and incomplete information
9. Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information
10. Cadillac contracts and up-front payments: Efficient investment under expectation damages
11. Holdups, standard breach remedies and optimal investment
12. Cheap talk about specific investments
13. Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts
14. The private supply of a public good
15. The theory of contracts
16. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
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19. Decentralization, externalities, and efficiency
20. Efficient contracting with reliance and a damage measure
21. Collusion under asymmetric information
22. Collusion and delegation
23. Collusion in organizations
24. Countervailing incentives in agency problems
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26. On countervailing incentives
27. Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents
28. Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
29. Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
30. Correlated information and mechanism design
31. The firm as a collection of assets
32. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
33. Two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information
34. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
35. Property rights and efficiency of voluntary bargaining under asymmetric information
36. Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the hold-up problem
37. Sequential investments and options to own
38. Pollution claim settlements under private information
39. Efficient reliance and damage measure for breach of contract
40. Contractual solutions to the hold-up problem
41. Renegotiation-proof implementation and time preferences
42. Randomization in coalition contracts
43. Collusion and the theory of organizations
44. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?
45. A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms