Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 141-158

  Cripps, Martin W ^a   Thomas, Jonathan P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031066472     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0520     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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