Repeated games with private monitoring: Two players

Econometrica

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 823-852

  Matsushima, Hitoshi ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Discounted repeated games; Efficiency; Folk theorem; Macro shock; Price setting duopoly; Private monitoring; Review strategies

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION THEORY; PROBABILITY; PROCESS CONTROL; RANDOM PROCESSES; THEOREM PROVING; VECTORS;

DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES; FOLK THEOREM; MACRO SHOCKS; PRICE-SETTING DUOPOLY; PRIVATE MONITORING; REVIEW STRATEGIES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 2642524464     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00513.x     Document Type: Article

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