Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations

Econometrica

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 407-432

  Cripps, Martin W ^a   Mailath, George J ^b   Samuelson, Larry ^c  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Imperfect monitoring; Repeated games; Reputation; Stackelberg types

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION THEORY; INSPECTION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NUMERICAL METHODS; THEOREM PROVING;

IMPERFECT MONITORING; IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS; REPEATED GAMES; STACKELBERG TYPES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 1642288293     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00496.x     Document Type: Article

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