Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 121, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 259-272

  Cripps, Martin W ^a   Dekel, Eddie ^b,c   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^d  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Repeated games; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 15844417538     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.009     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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6. M.W. Cripps J.P. Thomas Some asymptotic results in discounted repeated games of one-sided incomplete information Math. Operations Res. 28 2003 433-462
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