Cooperation and punishment

Econometrica

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 1061-1075

  Evans, Robert ^a   Thomas, Jonathan P ^b  

^a ST JOHN S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Common interests; Computability; Cooperation; Repeated games; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347156262     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00230     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. ANDERLINI, L., AND H. SABOURIAN (1995): "Cooperation and Effective Computability, " Econometrica, 63, 1337-1369.
2. AUMANN, R., AND S. SORIN (1989): "Cooperation and Bounded Recall, " Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 5-39.
3. CRIPPS, M., AND J. P. THOMAS (1995): "Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games without Discounting, " Econometrica, 63, 1401-1419.
4. EVANS, R., AND J. P. THOMAS (1997): "Reputation and Experimentation in Two-Player Repeated Games with Discounting, " Econometrica, 65, 1153-1173.
5. FUDENBERG, D., AND D. K. LEVINE (1989): "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player, " Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
6. SORIN, S. (1999): "Merging, Reputation and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, " Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 274-308.
7. WATSON, J. (1996): "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting, " Games and Economic Behavior, 15, 82-109.