Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 76, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 345-361

  Sekiguchi, Tadashi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000332090     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2313     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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