Reputation in perturbed repeated games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 387-410

  Cripps, Martin W ^a   Schmidt, Klaus M ^b   Thomas, Jonathan P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16144367459     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0060     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. M. AOYAGI, Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership with random public signals, mimeo, Univ. of Pittsburg, Nov. 1993.
2. M. CELENTANI, D. FUDENBERG, D. LEVINE, AND W. PESENDORFER, Maintaining a reputation against a patient opponent, mimeo, Harvard Univ., Dec. 1993.
3. M. CRIPPS, K. SCHMIDT, AND J. THOMAS, Reputation in perturbed repeated games, Discussion Paper No. A-410, SFB 303, Bonn Univ., June 1993.
4. M. CRIPPS AND J. THOMAS, Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting, Econometrica 63 (1995), 1401-1420.
5. M. CRIPPS AND J. THOMAS, Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games, mimeo, Warwick Univ., Feb. 1995.
6. D. FUDENBERG AND D. K. LEVINE, Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player, Econometrica 57 (1989), 759-778.
7. D. FUDENBERG AND D. K. LEVINE, Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed, Rev. Econ. Stud. 59 (1992), 561-579.
8. D. FUDENBERG AND D. K. LEVINE, Self-confirming equilibrium, Econometrica 61 (1993), 523-545.
9. D. FUDENBERG AND E. MASKIN, The Folk Theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information, Econometrica 54 (1986), 533-554.
10. K. SCHMIDT, Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interests, Econometrica 61 (1993), 325-351.
11. K. SCHMIDT, Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game, J. Econ. Theory 60 (1993), 114-139.