On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 286-300

  Wen, Quan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030121885     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0038     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Abreu, D., Pearce, D., and Stacchetti, E. (1993). "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," J. Econ. Theory 60, 217-240.
2. Benoît, J-P., and Krishna, V. (1985). "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica 53, 905-922.
3. Benoît, J-P., and Krishna, V. (1993). "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica 61, 303-324.
4. Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., and Whinston, M. (1987). "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium. I. Concept," J. Econ. Theory 42, 1-12.
5. Bernheim, B. D., and Ray, D. (1989). "Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games," Games and Econ. Behav. 1, 295-326.
6. Farrell, J., and Maskin, E. (1989). "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Games Econ. Behav. 1, 327-360.
7. Fudenberg, D., and Maskin, E. (1986). "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 54, 533-554.
8. Fudenberg, D., and Tirole, J. (1992). Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Pearce, D. (1987). "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," mimeo. Yale University.
10. van Damme, E. (1989). "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," J. Econ. Theory 47, 206-217.