Markov perfect equilibrium. I. Observable actions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 191-219

  Maskin, Eric ^a   Tirole, Jean ^b  

^a INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY   (United States)

^b Bureau MF529 Bat F   (France)

Author keywords

Dynamic games; Markov perfect equilibrium; Payoff relevant histories; Robustness; Simple strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035190305     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2785     Document Type: Article

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