Relational contracts and the theory of the firm

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 117, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 39-84

  Baker, George ^a   Gibbons, Robert ^a   Murphy, Kevin J ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036487679     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355302753399445     Document Type: Review

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