Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the Theory more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 20, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 526-546

  Cuevas Rodríguez, Gloria ^a   Gomez Mejia, Luis R ^b   Wiseman, Robert M ^c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD PABLO DE OLAVIDE   (Spain)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency Theory; Board Policy Issues; Corporate Governance; Executive Compensation; Stewardship

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868557966     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/corg.12004     Document Type: Article

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