Learning about a population of agents and the evolution of trust and cooperation

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 165-190

  Bower, Anthony G ^a   Garber, Steven ^a   Watson, Joel C ^b  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Defense; Game theory; Reputation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031543093     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(95)00495-5     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin, 1986, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information, Econometrica 54, 533-554.
4. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, 1991, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory 53, 236-260.
5. Gansler, J.S., 1989, Affording defense (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
6. Kitfield, J., 1986, Best of times, worst of times, Military Logistics Forum, August, pp.7-12.
7. Kreps, D.M., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson, 1982, Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245-252.
8. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986, A quest for excellence: Final report to the President, June.