Top executive remuneration: A view from Europe

Journal of Management Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 1493-1506

  Bruce, Alistair ^a   Buck, Trevor ^b   Main, Brian G M ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844435114     PISSN: 00222380     EISSN: 14676486     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00553.x     Document Type: Review

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