Moving closer to the action: Examining compensation design effects on firm risk

Organization Science

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 548-566

  Devers, Cynthia E ^a   McNamara, Gerry ^b   Wiseman, Robert M ^b   Arrfelt, Mathias ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Incentive alignment; Strategic risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 61349114266     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1070.0317     Document Type: Article

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