Executive compensation and tournament theory: Empirical tests on Danish data

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 262-280

  Eriksson, Tor ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033448498     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209920     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Baker, George; Gibbs, Michael; and Holmström, Bengt. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (November 1994): 881-919.
2. Becker, B., and Huselid, Mark. "The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compensation Systems." Administrative Science Quarterly 37 (June 1992): 336-50.
3. Bull, Clive; Schotter, Andrew; and Weigelt, Keith. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study." Journal of Political Economy 95 (February 1987): 1-33.
4. Conyon, Martin. "An Empirical Test of Tournament Theory Using Data on UK Executives." Photocopied. Warwick: University of Warwick, 1995.
5. Drago, Robert, and Garvey, Gerald. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Labor Economics 16, no. 1 (1998): 1-25.
6. Ehrenberg, Ronald, and Bognanno, Michael. "The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (February 1990): 74-88.
7. Eriksson, Tor, and Lausten, Mette. "Managerial Pay and Firm Performance - Danish Evidence." Photocopied. Aarhus: Aarhus School of Business, 1996.
8. Gibbons, Robert. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations." Working Paper no. 5705. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
9. Greens - Børsens håndbog om dansk erhvervsliv. Copenhagen: Børsens Forlag, various years.
10. Knoeber, Charles, and Thurman, Walther. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production." Journal of Labor Economics 12 (April 1994): 155-79.
11. Lambert, Richard; Larcker, David; and Weigelt, Keith. "The Structure of Organizational Incentives." Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (September 1993): 438-61.
12. Lazear, Edward. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics." Journal of Political Economy 97 (June 1989): 561-80.
13. _. "The Job as a Concept." In Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, edited by William Burns. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
14. _. Personnel Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
15. Lazear, Edward, and Rosen, Sherwin. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 841-64.
16. Leonard, Jonathan. "Executive Pay and Firm Performance." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (February 1990): 13-29.
17. Main, Brian; O'Reilly, Charles, III; and Wade, James. "Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?" Journal of Labor Economics 11 (June 1993): 606-28.
18. McLaughlin, Kenneth. "Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey." In Research in Labor Economics, vol. 9, edited by Ronald Ehrenberg, pp. 225-256. Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1988.
19. Milgrom, Paul, and Roberts, John. "The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes." American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 80 (May 1990): 154-59.
20. O'Reilly, Charles, III; Main, Brian; and Crystal, Graef. "CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories." Administrative Science Quarterly 33 (June 1988): 257-74.
21. Prendergast, Canice. "What Happens within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies." Working Paper no. 5802. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
22. Rosen, Sherwin. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments." American Economic Review 76 (September 1986): 701-15.
23. _. "Contracts and the Market for Executives." In Contract Economics, edited by Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
24. Waldman, Michael. "Job Assignment, Signalling, and Efficiency." RAND Journal of Economics 8 (Summer 1984): 255-87.