An experimental study of a dynamic principal–agent relationship

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 4-5, 1998, Pages 327-341

  Güth, Werner ^a   Klose, Wolfgang ^a   Königstein, Manfred ^a   Schwalbach, Joachim ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846674421     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199806/08)19:4/5<327::AID-MDE894>3.0.CO;2-X     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. J. E. Berg, L. A. Daley, J. W. Dickhaut and J. O’Brien (1992). Moral hazard and risk sharing: experimental evidence. In Research in Experimental Economics (edited by R. M. Isaac), Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 5, pp. 1–34.
2. J. L. Berg, J. Dickhaut and K. A. McCabe (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142.
3. F. de Waal (1982). Chimpansee Politics, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
4. S. Epstein (1992). Testing principalagent theory. In Research in Experimental Economics (edited by R. M. Isaac), Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 5, pp. 35–60.
5. E. F. Fama and M. C. Jensen (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 327–349.
6. E. Fehr and S. Gächter (1997). How effective are trust-and reciprocity-based incentives? In Economics, Values and Organizations (edited by A. Benner and L. Putterman), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. E. Fehr, G. Kirchsteiger and A. Riedl (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437–459.
8. E. Fehr, S. Gächter and K. Kirchsteiger (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65, 833–860.
9. S. Finkelstein and D. C. Hambrick (1988). Chief executive compensation: a synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal, 9, 543–558.
10. W. Güth, E. van Damme and M. Weber (1993). The normative and behavioral concept of risk aversion–an experimental study. Working Paper, Tilburg University.
11. J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12. O. Hart and B. Holmstrom (1987). The theory of contracts. In Adances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress (edited by T. Bewley), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.
14. M. C. Jensen and K. J. Murphy (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225–264.
15. C. Keser and M. Willinger (1997). Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden. Working Paper, University of Karlsruhe.
16. M. Königstein (1997). Measuring treatment-effects in experimental cross-sectional time series. Working Paper, Humboldt-University at Berlin.
17. R. Marris and D. C. Mueller (1980). The corporation, competition and the invisible hand. Journal of Economic Literature, 18, 32–63.
18. M. Osterloh and B. S. Frey (1997). Managing motivation: crowding effects in the theory of the firm. Working Paper, University of Zürich.
19. A. E. Roth (1995). Bargaining experiments. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics (edited by J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 253–348.
20. R. Selten (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55.
21. R. Selten, A. Sadrieh and K. Abbink (1995). Money does not induce risk-neutral behavior, but binary-lotteries do even worse. Discussion Paper, SFB 303, No. B-343, Bonn University.
22. E. van Damme (1987). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Berlin: Springer Verlag.
23. G. A. Young (1986). Patterns of threat and punishment reciprocity in a conflict setting. Journal for Personality of Social Psychology, 51, 541–546.