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Volumn 23, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 2060-2098

Strategic flexibility and the optimality of pay for sector performance

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EID: 77951215839     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp118     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (98)

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