Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 353-384

  Himmelberg, Charles P ^a   Hubbard, R Glenn ^a   Palia, Darius ^a,b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; D23; G14; G32; L14; L22; Managerial ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000712212     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00025-2     Document Type: Article

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