An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 80, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 603-626

  Goldman, Eitan ^a   Slezak, Steve L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Fraud; Governance; Information manipulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645160245     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.007     Document Type: Article

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