Wealth and executive compensation

Journal of Finance

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 379-397

  Becker, Bo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645051960     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00839.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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