Executive compensation and short-termist behaviour in speculative markets

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 577-610

  Bolton, Patrick ^a   Scheinkman, José ^b   Xiong, Wei ^b  

^a NBER ^*  (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION SYSTEM; NUMERICAL MODEL; PRICE DYNAMICS; STOCK MARKET;

EID: 33745808764     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00388.x     Document Type: Article

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