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Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 231-261

CEO compensation and board structure

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Indexed keywords


EID: 58849157871     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (386)

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