Emperical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 145-171

  Rajgopal, Shivaram ^a   Shevlin, Terry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Hedging; Management compensation; Oil and gas; Risk taking; Stock option

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036271833     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00042-3     Document Type: Article

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