Has moral hazard become a more important factor in managerial compensation?

American Economic Review

Volumn 99, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 1740-1769

  Gayle, George Levi ^a   Miller, Robert A ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 74949129894     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1740     Document Type: Article

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