Corporate Governance Externalities

Review of Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-33

  Acharya, Viral V ^a   Volpin, Paolo F ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 76549101802     PISSN: 15723097     EISSN: 1573692X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfp002     Document Type: Article

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