The dating game: Do managers designate option grant dates to increase their compensation?

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 21, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1907-1945

  Narayanan, M P ^a,b   Seyhun, H Nejat ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52449105688     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhm044     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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