CEO compensation, change, and corporate strategy

Journal of Finance

Volumn 60, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 2701-2727

  Dow, James ^a   Raposo, Clara C ^b  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LISBON   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28244486112     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00814.x     Document Type: Article

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