The dependence of pay-performance sensitivity on the size of the firm

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 80, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 436-443

  Schaefer, Scott ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032367390     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003465398557537     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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