Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 615-691

  Fehr, Ernst ^a   Schmidt, Klaus M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

altruism; behavioral economics; competition; contracts; experiments; fairness; incentives; other regarding preferences; reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649385815     PISSN: 15740714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01008-6     Document Type: Review

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