Transparency and reciprocal behavior in employment relations

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 383-403

  Irlenbusch, Bernd ^a   Sliwka, Dirk ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Gift exchange; Inequity aversion; Reciprocity; Reputation; Transparency

Indexed keywords

EID: 13944279277     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.016     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Abbink K. Irlenbusch B. Renner E. The moonlighting game - an experimental study on reciprocity and retribution Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42 2000 265-277
2. Berg J. Dickhaut J. McCabe K. Trust, reciprocity and social history Games and Economic Behavior 10 1995 122-142
3. Bolton G. Ockenfels A. ERC - a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition American Economic Review 90 2000 166-193
4. Brandts J. Charness G. Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games Experimental Economics 2 2000 227-238
5. Charness G. Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42 2000 375-384
6. Charness, G. Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation. Journal of Labor Economics, in press
7. Charness G. Rabin M. Understanding social preferences with simple tests Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 2002 817-869
8. Clark K. Sefton M. The sequential prisoner's dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation Economic Journal 111 2001 51-68
9. Dufwenberg M. Gneezy U. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game Games and Economic Behavior 30 2000 163-182
10. Dufwenberg M. Kirchsteiger G. Reciprocity and wage undercutting European Economic Review 44 2000 1069-1078
11. Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G. A theory of sequential reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, in press
12. Falk, A., Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., 2000. Testing theories of fairness - intentions matter. Working paper no. 63, University of Zurich
13. Falk, A., Fischbacher, U., 1998. A theory of reciprocity. Working paper no. 6, University of Zurich
14. Fehr E. Gächter S. Kirchsteiger G. Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device-experimental evidence Econometrica 64 1997 833-860
15. Fehr E. Gächter S. Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 3 2000 159-181
16. Fehr E. Kirchsteiger G. Riedl A. Does fairness prevent market clearing? an experimental investigation Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 3 1993 437-460
17. Fehr E. Schmidt K. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 3 1999 817-868
18. Fischbacher, U., 1999. Z-tree: A toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Working paper no. 21, University of Zurich
19. Frey B.S. Does monitoring increase work effort? the rivalry with trust and loyality Economic Inquiry 31 3 1993 663-670
20. Gächter S. Falk A. Reputation and reciprocity: Consequences for the labor relation Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104 1 2002 1-26
21. Griffith T.L. Monitoring and performance: A comparison of computer and supervisor monitoring Journal of Applied Social Psychology 23 1 1993 549-772
22. Grossman S. Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem Econometrica 51 1 1983 7-45
23. Güth W. Huck S. Ockenfels P. Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information Economic Journal 106 1 1996 593-604
24. Hart O. Holmström B. The theory of contracts. In: Bewley T. (Ed.). Advances in Economic Theory 1987 Cambridge University Press Cambridge 71-155
25. Huck S. Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information Journal of Economic Psychology 20 1 1999 183-206
26. Kagel J. Kim C.K. Moser D. Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs Games and Economic Behavior 13 1 1996 100-110
27. Levine D. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments Review of Economic Dynamics 1 1 1998 593-622
28. Mitzkewitz M. Nagel R. Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information International Journal of Game Theory 22 1 1993 171-198
29. Nagin D. Rebitzer J. Sanders S. Taylor L. Monitoring, motivation and management: The determinants of opportunistic behavior in a field experiment American Economic Review 92 1 2002 850-873
30. Rabin M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics American Economic Review 83 1 1993 1281-1302
31. Sappington D. Incentives in principal-agent relationships Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 1 1991 45-66
32. Sethi R. Somanathan E. Understanding reciprocity Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 50 1 2003 1-27
33. Theil H. Principles of Econometrics 1971 John Wiley & Sons New York
34. Van der Heijden E. Nelissen J. Potters J. Verbon H. Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory Economic Inquiry 39 1 2001 280-297