Truth or consequences: An experiment

Management Science

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 116-130

  Brandts, Jordi ^a   Charness, Gary ^b  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Deception; Fair process; Honorable behavior; Laboratory experiments; Punishment; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; PERSONNEL; WAGES;

DECISION ELICITATION METHODS; FAIR PROCESS; HONORABLE BEHAVIOR;

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 0037281604     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.1.116.12755     Document Type: Article

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