Why punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 407-429

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a   Matthews, Peter Hans ^a   Ong'ong'a, Okomboli ^b  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Experiment; Norm; Punishment; Social dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 4744353200     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-004-0212-1     Document Type: Article

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