The neural basis of altruistic punishment

Science

Volumn 305, Issue 5688, 2004, Pages 1254-1258

  De Quervain, Dominique J F ^a   Fischbacher, Urs ^a   Treyer, Valerie ^b   Schellhammer, Melanie ^a   Schnyder, Ulrich ^b   Buck, Alfred ^b   Fehr, Ernst ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^c Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Collegium Helveticum   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BRAIN; COSTS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; TOMOGRAPHY;

ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; DECISIVE FORCE; EVOLUTIONARY MODELS; NORM VIOLATIONS; SYMBOLIC PUNISHMENT;

NEURAL NETWORKS;

BEHAVIOR; BIOLOGY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; CORPUS STRIATUM; ECONOMIC ASPECT; HUMAN; POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SATISFACTION;

ADULT; ALTRUISM; BRAIN MAPPING; CAUDATE NUCLEUS; CORPUS STRIATUM; EMOTIONS; FRONTAL LOBE; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; MALE; PERSONAL SATISFACTION; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; PUNISHMENT; QUESTIONNAIRES; REWARD; THALAMUS; TOMOGRAPHY, EMISSION-COMPUTED;

EID: 4344626095     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1100735     Document Type: Article

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45. We gratefully acknowledge support by the University of Zurich, the Swiss National Science Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation Network on Economic Environments and the Evolution of Individual Preferences and Social Norms. We thank R. Adolphs, T. Singer, and L. Jäncke for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.