Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 23-39

  Keser, Claudia ^a   Van Winden, Frans ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Experimental economics; Public goods; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040194024     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00182     Document Type: Article

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