Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 453-474

  Fehr, Ernst ^a   Schmidt, Klaus M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experiments; Fairness; Incentives; Moral hazard; Multiple tasks

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; INCENTIVE; MODEL;

EID: 10444266693     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00372.x     Document Type: Article

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