Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Econometrica

Volumn 73, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 2017-2030

  Falk, Armin ^a   Fehr, Ernst ^b   Fischbacher, Urs ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Fairness; Reciprocity; Sanctioning; Social norm; Spitefulness

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144443364     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x     Document Type: Article

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