Do labour market conditions affect gift exchange? Some experimental evidence

Economic Journal

Volumn 114, Issue 497, 2004, Pages 684-708

  Brandts, Jordi ^a   Charness, Gary ^b  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; LABOR MARKET; MARKET CONDITIONS; MINIMUM WAGE;

EID: 3242875398     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00237.x     Document Type: Article

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