Is there a hold-up problem?

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 475-494

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a   Johannesson, Magnus ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Communication; Coordination; Fairness

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; COMMUNICATION; INVESTMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 10444254655     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00373.x     Document Type: Article

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