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Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 221-232

Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules

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EID: 0038467433     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055403000637     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (101)

References (23)
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