Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 251-284

  Falk, Armin ^a   Gächter, Simon ^a   Kovács, Judit ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF DEBRECEN   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Equity; Gift exchange game; Incomplete contracts; Labor relations; Reciprocity; Repeated interaction; Social approval

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001520977     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(99)00009-4     Document Type: Article

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