Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: Experimental evidence

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 278-311

  Okada, Akira ^a   Riedl, Arno ^b  

^a HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Inefficiency; Reciprocity; Social exclusion

Indexed keywords

EID: 11244336795     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.006     Document Type: Article

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