A theory of sequential reciprocity

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 268-298

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a   Kirchsteiger, Georg ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Extensive form games; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942445391     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003     Document Type: Article

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