The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions

Science

Volumn 312, Issue 5770, 2006, Pages 108-111

  Gürerk, Özgür ^a   Irlenbusch, Bernd ^b   Rockenbach, Bettina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

HUMAN SOCIETIES; MANIFESTATION; SANCTION-FREE INSTITUTION; SOCIAL ORDER;

NATURAL SCIENCES;

ALTRUISM; COMPETITIVENESS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; SANCTION; SOCIAL THEORY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; COMPETITION; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; NORMAL HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SANCTIONING INSTITUTION; SOCIAL ATTITUDE; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL LEARNING; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL STRUCTURE; SOCIETY;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL SCIENCES;

EID: 33645679620     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1123633     Document Type: Article

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