Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 593-622

  Levine, David K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001090144     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0023     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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