Stackelberg beats cournot: On collusion and efficiency in experimental markets

Economic Journal

Volumn 111, Issue 474, 2001, Pages 749-765

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Muller, Wieland ^b   Normann, Hans Theo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038782234     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00658     Document Type: Article

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