A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 114, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 817-868

  Fehr, Ernst ^a   Schmidt, Klaus M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000773694     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355399556151     Document Type: Article

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