Evolutionary game dynamics

Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 479-519

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Sigmund, Karl ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141680332     PISSN: 02730979     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1090/S0273-0979-03-00988-1     Document Type: Review

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