Learning, Matching, and Aggregation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 79-110

  Hopkins, Ed ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Games; fictitious play; reinforcement learning; evolution

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002127719     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0647     Document Type: Article

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